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1 Introduction
In many countries, infrastructure sectors that have historically been vertically integrated nat-
ural monopolies subject to public regulation, such as electric power, railroads, and natural gas
production and distribution, are being restructured. Most restructuring programs distinguish
between potentially competitive sectors (e.g. electricity generation, railroad rolling stock, and
natural gas production), where prices and entry will be deregulated, and natural monopoly
or \network infrastructure" segments (e.g. electric transmission networks, railroad track and
terminal networks, and natural gas pipeline and distribution networks) which continue to be
subject to some form of public control of prices, entry, and service quality. Importantly, suppli-
ers in the competitive segments require access to the network infrastructure segments in order
to supply their services to consumers in competition with their rivals.
The demand for utilization of infrastructure networks often varies widely from hour to
hour, day to day and month to month. During some time periods, one or more points or
\interfaces" on the network can become congested as suppliers’ demand to use the interface
would exceed its capacity if the price for using the interface were zero. The competitive market
value of the output of the suppliers in the competitive segments depends on where the suppliers
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are located and whether they must \transport" their products over congested portions of the
network. In general, market prices for the competitively supplied services will be higher on
the side of the network constraint which is a net importer of competitive services (\the high
side") than on the side of the network constraint which is a net exporter of services supplied
by the competitive segments of the industry (\the low side"). Prices for and the protability
of services supplied by the competitive segment can vary widely over time and across locations
on the network as supply and demand conditions fluctuate. Network congestion can aect
the attributes of the distribution of prices and prots at dierent locations. The associated
variations in prices create a demand by risk averse buyers and sellers for instruments to hedge
price fluctuations.1 These prices also provide the economic signals that should guide investment
in additional infrastructure capacity. We do not discuss investment issues in this paper, but
focus on networks with xed capital (capacity) stocks.
In order to facilitate ecient utilization of scarce network interface capacity a mechanism
must be implemented to ration the use of the congested network eciently. Market mecha-
nisms that rely on \congestion prices" to ration the use of scarce network capacity are generally
favored over administrative rationing mechanisms. The development of mechanisms to deter-
mine ecient network congestion prices is complicated by several important factors. First, the
operator/owner of the network is a monopoly and cannot be relied upon itself either to set the
right prices or to make the right level of investments if it is unregulated. Accordingly, if the
operator/owner of the network is to be relied upon to set the right congestion prices and to
make the right network investments, the design of the regulatory mechanisms applied to the
network operator are critical to its performance. Asymmetric information necessarily limits
the ability of regulators both to provide incentives for the network operator to make ecient
pricing and investment decisions and to keep the network operator from extracting rents from
network users. Second, supply and demand conditions on the network vary widely and rapidly
over time. The appropriate market clearing prices to manage congestion also vary widely and
1A form of risk aversion is generated by rms’ need to insure against liquidity shocks when nancial markets
are plagued by agency problems and credit rationing. See Holmstro¨m-Tirole (l998). In the U. S., electricity
marketers and unregulated generators have aggressively promoted the need for \rm transmission rights" that
will allow them to insure themselves against the costs of network congestion.
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rapidly along with these changing supply and demand conditions. Third, the congurations of
most infrastructure networks create potential network externality problems. That is, utilization
decisions at one point on the network aect supply conditions and congestion on other points
on the network.
An increasingly popular approach to the challenges associated with allocating eciently
congested network interfaces and to creating hedging instruments related to fluctuations in
congestion prices is to decentralize congestion pricing by creating and allocating some form
of tradable property rights which give a holder either a physical right to use the congested
interfaces or a nancial right to be compensated for congestion charges assessed to allocate
their use.2 In the case of an electric power network, which is the focus of this paper, the
two types of tradable property rights are being discussed. The rst approach is to create and
allocate \physical rights" to use the network. Under this approach, the capacity of each of
the potentially congested interfaces is dened and rights to use this capacity are created and
allocated in some way to suppliers and consumers. A supplier must possess a physical right
to have its supplies scheduled or \transported" over the congested interface. Once it has such
a physical right, there is no additional charge for using the congested interface. The markets
for these physical rights then determine the market clearing price for congestion. Increases in
the capacity of congested interfaces resulting from new investments, also create new physical
rights to use this capacity and these rights may be sold by the investors who add the network
capacity to third parties.3
2Historically in the U.S., vertically integrated utilities had \physical" transmission rights reflecting their
ownership of transmission assets that were components of congested interfaces and interface capacity ratings
assigned to these interfaces by regional reliability councils (Joskow-Schmalensee 1983). The allocation and
use of physical rights under this system relied on a \contract path" model that ignored loop flow problems.
These rights were used by vertically integrated utilities primarily to support their own wholesale purchases and
sales of electricity. Regulators could not force them to sell these rights to third parties. If they did sell these
transmission rights, prices were capped on the average accounting cost of the transmission lines they owned. The
Energy Policy Act of 1992 expanded federal authority to require utilities to sell unused physical transmission
capacity to third parties. The standard terms and conditions for making these rights available are dened in
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Orders 888, 888a, 888b, and 889. These orders also are built on a
physical rights/contract path model. However, restructured electric power sectors in California, Pennsylvania-
New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) and New York are built around \network" models, and tradable \nancial rights"
rather than physical rights are being proposed as the instrument for providing \rm transmission service."
3The transportation of natural gas by interstate pipeline systems in the U.S. relies on a \point to point"
physical rights system. These rights may be traded, but at the present time the prices at which they can be
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An alternative approach is to create and allocate \nancial rights" associated with each
congested interface (or a portfolio of congested interfaces).4 Under the ideal market structure
for utilizing the nancial rights approach, buyers and sellers submit bids to the network operator
to buy and sell power at dierent locations (\nodes") on the network. The network operator
then chooses the lowest cost bids to balance electricity supply and demand subject to the
physical laws that govern electric power networks and the capacity of the network to carry
power reliably. The bid price of the last bidder selected (or the rst bidder rejected) at a node
becomes the market clearing price at this node. So, an upstream supplier which is delivering
competitive electric generation services to customers downstream of the congested interface
receives a lower net price than do suppliers located downstream in proximity to consumers.
The dierence between the downstream price and the upstream price is the congestion price.
Those who have obtained nancial rights over the congested interface receive a share of the
congestion revenues proportionate to the share of the total interface capacity each rights holder
has covered by nancial rights. So, if a generator upstream of the congested interface has
covered all of its deliveries by acquiring nancial rights it is in the same position (ignoring the
sunk costs of acquiring the rights) as a similarly situated generator who is a physical rights
holder and has acquired rights to just enough capacity to cover its deliveries, other things
equal. The nancial or physical rights fully insulate the upstream supplier from making any
net congestion payments for the quantity \exported" that it has covered by acquiring a right.
The actual organization of restructured electricity markets around the world often diers
from this idealized structure. For example, while the system in England and Wales relies on a
bid-based system for determining energy prices, it does not provide directly for nodal pricing
of energy to reflect congestion (or losses). Argentina has adopted a framework closer to the
traded are subject to a cost-based cap specied by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (\FERC").
When congestion costs are high, these caps prevent the secondary rights market from allocating these physical
rights eciently. Gas transporters appear to be able eectively to evade these caps by buying gas on one side
of a congested pipeline segment and then reselling it on the other side of the congested segment since the price
of gas is unregulated. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Natural Gas 1996: Issues and Trends,
DOE/EIA-0560(96), December 1996, Washington, D.C.; U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, Regulation of Short-term Natural Gas Transportation Services, July 29, 1998.
4The Independent System Operators (ISO) in California and PJM have proposed to U.S. federal energy
regulators (FERC) the use of nancial rights rather than physical rights. See also Harvey et al. (1996) and
Chao-Peck (1996).
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idealized model, but recognizes a limited number of potentially congested interfaces for nodal
pricing purposes. The system being implemented in PJM is built around a bid-based nodal
pricing and dispatch model, but generators are also allowed to enter into individual bilateral
contracts with buyers and simply schedule their generation with the ISO without going through
the bidding and dispatch process. Schedules pursuant to bilateral contracts are then assessed a
congestion charge based on the dierence between the nodal prices at the supply and demand
nodes specied in the bilateral contract and based on the clearing prices resulting from the
bidding and dispatch process.5 California and New York also have a mixture of a bid-based
dispatch and pricing framework and a bilateral contract or self-scheduling framework with
separate congestion charges assessed for schedules across congested interfaces.
It is not our objective here to discuss the full set of reasons why a physical rights mechanism
might be preferred to a nancial rights mechanism or vice versa. The relevant considerations
include the transactions costs associated with using, trading and enforcing the dierent types
of rights to facilitate ecient supply of the competitive service given network constraints, the
need to adjust the supply of rights to reflect rapid changes in the quantity of network capacity
actually available at any particular point in time, market power in both the rights market
and the energy market, and other considerations. We focus here on (a) how the allocation of
nancial rights may aect competition or enhance seller and buyer market power in the markets
for electric generation when a transmission network is congested and (b) how rights markets
with dierent microstructures allocate nancial rights among generators and consumers and
determine rights prices. In a companion paper [Joskow-Tirole 1998] we perform a symmetrical
analysis of physical rights and compare the properties of physical and nancial rights under
dierent market conditions.
Much of the analysis in these papers examines a simple two-node network, so that the
broader set of transactions cost and institutional issues that may distinguish the performance
of nancial and physical rights systems can be ignored. This enables us to focus on market
power issues related to nancial and physical transmission rights. However, we also provide
5Thus, while PJM involves a mix of bid-based dispatch and bilateral contracts, physical and nancial rights
do not coexist. The bilateral contracts are just akin to a pair of inelastic bids at the two corresponding nodes.
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a brief analysis of a three-node network which allows us to examine whether and how the
introduction of the kind of \loop flows" that characterize many electric power networks aects
our results. We nd that our results vis-a-vis the relationships between the allocation of rights
and maret power are robust to loop flow considerations, although loop flow introduces some
interesting twists to the analysis.
We show that who owns the rm transmission rights (nancial or physical) is endogenous,
as are the eects of the availability of transmission rights on market power. Buyers and sellers
at dierent locations (nodes) on the network compete for these rights, which cannot a priori be
assumed to belong to a particular player. The willingnesses to pay of dierent players depends
on their locations on the network and whether or not they have market power. However,
who acquires the rights depends not only on willingness to pay for the rights, but also on the
microstructure of the markets in which rights are traded.
We nd that allocating nancial rights to a generator with market power located in the
importing region enhances its market power. The more rights that the generator with market
power in the importing region is allocated, the more its market power is enhanced and the
higher is the delivered price of energy paid by consumers. The number of rights that will be
allocated to the generator with market power depends on the microstructure of the market for
nancial rights. In particular, it depends on whether the rights market is organized in a way
that mitigates free riding by others on the increased congestion rents that a generator with
market power can earn by increasing energy prices in the importing region to levels above their
\no rights" level. Allocating rights to a generator with market power in the exporting region
does not enhance its market power or aect delivered prices paid by consumers. This is the
case because a generator with market power in the exporting region can already capture the
scarcity rents associated with transmission congestion. Indeed, the presence of a generator with
market power in the exporting region mitigates the market power enhancing eects of nancial
rights allocated to a generator with market power in the importing region.
We also nd that nancial rights can aect the behavior of electricity consumers as well.
Financial rights allocated to a buyer of energy with market power (a monopsony) located in the
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importing region will reduce the buyer’s incentives to exercise such market power. On the other
hand, allocating nancial rights to a monopsony buyer of energy located in the exporting region
would enhance its market power. The ultimate allocation of rights continues to depend on the
microstructure of the rights market and the relative valuations of the rights by generators and
consumers with market power energy market.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 species the attributes of the simple two-node
network and derives the competitive equilibrium prices, quantities and the ISO’s (Independent
System Operator) merchandising surplus in the absence of nancial rights. Sections 3 and 4
examine how the allocation of nancial rights (ignoring the cost of buying these rights) aects
the behavior of suppliers and consumers at dierent locations when they have seller or buyer
market power. This analysis takes place in the context of three dierent microstructures for the
markets for nancial and how they aect the allocation to dierent stakeholders and the market
prices for the rights. Section 5 discusses regulatory issues and challenges that arise regarding
the interaction between the allocation of nancial and market power. Section 6 generalizes the
analysis to allow for loop flow problems. Section 7 concludes with a summary of the main policy
implications. Our companion paper conducts a symmetrical analysis for physical transmission
rights, highlighting dierences between nancial rights and physical rights.
2 A simple competitive electricity model with conges-
tion
We focus initially on a restructured electricity sector that consists of a group of unintegrated
and unregulated generating companies and an ISO which operates the transmission network,
manages a spot energy market, and dispatches generators based upon their bids to supply
generation services so as to balance the supply and demand for generation services in an ecient
manner, taking into account physical constraints on the transmission network. The demand side
can be thought of either as demand placed in the wholesale market by distribution companies
which then resell the generation services to end-use consumers or as retailing intermediaries
who buy energy in the wholesale market and then resell directly to end-use consumers who
7
have paid for access to \unbundled" distribution \wires" services. If the generation service
suppliers and buyers behave competitively, the bidding process truthfully reveals the marginal
cost curves and demand functions to the ISO. The ISO knows the physical constraints on
the transmission network and, therefore, is in a position to enable an ecient dispatch of the
generators given transmission constraints. The ecient dispatch may exhaust the capacity on
some links, leading to congestion and congestion charges for using the congested link dened
by the dierence in nodal prices for electricity. This industry structure goes along naturally
with a nancial transmission rights system which players can rely on to hedge the uncertain
costs associated with congestion charges.
We work initially with a simple two-node (no loop flow) network where there are a set of
low-cost generators (G1 ) in the North which produce output q1 and have an aggregate cost
function C1(q1), with C
0
1 > 0 and C
00
1 > 0. We assume initially that these generators behave
competitively when they submit supply bids to the ISO. There is no demand in the North
and we refer to the North as being either the upstream location or the exporting region. The
market clearing price for generation sold in the North is p1. In the South, there are electricity
consumers and a set of generators (G2) that have higher production costs (within the relevant
range) than do the generators in the North. We refer to the South as the downstream location
or the importing region. We assume initially that these generators too behave competitively.
The market clearing price for generation in the South is p2. (In the next section we examine
cases where there is seller or buyer market power at each node.) Consumers have a demand
function Q = q1 + q2 = D(p2) with D
0 < 0 and where p2 is the price for all generation service
paid by consumers in the South.
Finally, there is a transmission line linking the North with the South which has a xed
capacity equal to K. The nondepreciated capital and operating costs of this link are assumed
to be recovered separately from consumers in lump sum charges net of revenues produced by
selling physical or nancial transmission rights6 and we do not consider these costs further in
6In both California and in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) restructured systems, revenues
from sales of transmission rights are returned to the owners of the transmission capacity to help to defray their
capital and operating costs. This approach could create problems if the distribution companies have market
power and retain the revenue from the rights sales. This is not what is intended to occur, however. The ISO
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our analysis. To further simplify things, we also ignore thermal losses on the network. We focus
on situations where demand is suciently high that it cannot all be fully served by generators
in the North because the transmission capacity constraint is binding. That is, some supplies
from the less ecient generators in the South are required to balance supply and demand at the
competitive prices. Thus, the marginal cost of generation in the North must be lower than the
marginal cost of generation in the South when K is binding and \nodal prices" p1 and p2, which
under perfect competition will be equal to the marginal costs in the North (C 01) and the South
(C 02) respectively, will dier from one another with p1 < p2. Note, however, that consumers in
the South pay the nodal price p2 for all of their consumption (Q = q1 + q2). Accordingly, if
the capacity of the transmission line is a binding constraint, scarcity rents K(p2 − p1) accrue
to the ISO, absent an alternative allocation of rights to collect these rents. We refer to these
rents below as the ISO’s \merchandising surplus."
We recognize that this is a highly simplied characterization of an electric power network.
However, it is important to understand the eects of dierent types of transmission rights in
a simple network before we go into more complex networks. Moreover, the two-node network
model captures important congestion attributes of real electric power networks or sub-networks
in England and Wales, Argentina, and New Zealand. It is also in this type of simple network
where physical rights are the most likely to represent a practical alternative to nancial trans-
mission rights because the transactions costs and network externality problems associated with
physical rights are less severe in such a simple network. We extend this analysis to a three-node
network which takes loop flow into account to test whether and how loop flow (Kirchho’s laws)
aects the results that we derive for the simple two-node case.
Consider rst the case where generators behave competitively and bid their marginal cost
curves to the energy/generator dispatch market run by the ISO. Assume initially that there
are neither nancial nor physical transmission rights as we have described them above. Any
generator can oer to supply energy over the network, but the ISO only selects the lowest
cost suppliers to meet demand given the bids it receives and taking into account transmission
denes the quantity of rights to be auctioned for each potentially congested link and denes the auction rules.
The revenues are then treated as pure pass-through credits to end-use consumers connected to the network.
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capacity limits. Under these assumptions the nodal prices in the North and the South are given
by the following equations:
p1 = C
0
1(K);
p2 = C
0
2(D(p

2)−K)) > p

1
q1 = K
D(p2) = q1 + q2 = K + q2:
In this case, the ISO (eectively) sells K + q2 units of output for p

2 per unit to consumers, but
only pays out p1q1 + p

2q2 to the generators. Accordingly, it earns a \merchandising surplus" of
(p2− p

1)K. One can alternatively think of these net revenues as congestion payments (p

2− p

1)
made by the suppliers in the North to use the scarce transmission interface.
Remark: In what follows we ignore price uncertainty and focus on the eects of market power
on the allocation of transmission rights and the associated equilibrium prices, quantities, and
production costs with dierent market microstructures. Most of the previous literature on which
we build (Bushnell 1998, Oren 1997, Hogan 1992) also ignore uncertainty and simply focus on
situations when the link(s) is congested. This may seem odd, however, since one motivation
for both nancial and physical rights is to create instruments that allow buyers and sellers
to \hedge" variations in prots (due both to variations in equilibrium supply prices and/or
congestion charges) caused by congestion on the network. It is useful to focus rst on how
market power aects the demand for rights and, given the characterization of market power,
how rights markets with dierent microstructures allocate these rights. We can then proceed
to examine whether and how the purchase of rights for hedging purposes can be distinguished
from the purchase of rights for the purpose of enhancing market power. We begin to explore
this latter set of issues in section 5 below.
Now we dene more precisely what we mean by \nancial" transmission rights:
Financial rights : Financial rights give the holders a proportionate share of the congestion
payments or merchandising surplus received by the ISO when the transmission constraint K is
binding. The owners of these rights may be generators, consumers, or speculators. Generators
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do not require nancial rights to be dispatched by the ISO. But without them they must pay
congestion charges when they supply over a congested link. There are K rights issued and the
owner of one unit of nancial rights entitles the owner to  = (p2− p1), or the dierence in the
nodal prices. Total payments given to rights holders are equal to (p2 − p1)K ((p2 − p

1)K in
equilibrium).
If there is no market power in the generation market, the introduction of nancial rights
into this simple system has no eect on the prices for energy or the allocation of resources.
The ISO’s revenue from congestion rents or its merchandising surplus is now transferred to the
owners of nancial rights. The nodal prices for energy are as dened above and the competitive
market value of the nancial transmission rights is simply equal to the dierence in nodal prices.
Nodal energy prices and the price of nancial rights are therefore given by
p1 = C
0
1(K) (1)
p2 = C
0
2(D(p

2)−K) > p

1 (2)
 = p2 − p

1: (3)
These equilibrium conditions for a competitive electricity market with tradable nancial
transmission rights provide a benchmark against which we can compare other market outcomes.
In particular, we want to explore the interaction between market power in the electricity market
and the allocation of nancial transmission rights to sellers and buyers of electricity and how
alternative microstructures for the rights market ultimately aect the allocation of rights among
electricity sellers and buyers under alternative assumptions about market power.
3 Financial rights and market power
We now proceed to examine the value of nancial rights to dierent rights holders under al-
ternative assumptions about seller and buyer market power. We will then proceed to examine
how the value of rights under these alternative assumptions about the market structure of the
power market interacts with the microstructure of the nancial rights market to determine the
allocation and prices of nancial transmission rights.
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3.1 Market power at the expensive node: No nancial rights
We assume here that the generators in the South (G2) are owned by a single rm that has market
power, while the generators in the North (G1) behave competitively. The single generator in
the South now maximizes prots given its residual demand curve, dened by consumer demand
for electricity in the South net of the supply of electricity from the North. The price in the
South is higher than in the perfectly competitive environment and so the transmission link is
congested (q1 = K) a fortiori.
The nodal price, quantities produced, and generator prots in the North are the same as in
the competitive cases analyzed earlier:
p1 = C
0
1(K) = p

1:
However, when G2 holds no nancial rights, G2 now chooses p2 by maximizing prot against
its residual demand curve
q2 = D(p2)−K:
G2’s prot function is the prot associated with generation supplies:
G(p2) = p2[D(p2)−K]− C2(D(P2)−K):
We assume that G() is strictly concave. The prot maximizing price pm2 is higher and the
quantity qm2 produced in the South lower than they would be if G2 behaved competitively:
pm2 > p

2 and q
m
2 < q

2 :
The price of the rights is
m = pm2 − p

1:
3.2 Market power at the expensive node: Impact of holding nan-
cial rights
We still assume that there is a single generator in the South with market power but allow
this generator to hold nancial rights. Recall that the value of nancial rights is given by the
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dierence between the nodal prices for energy in the North and in the South. Since market
power in the South increases energy prices in the South, congestion rents and the value of
nancial rights,
F(p2) = (p2 − p

1)K;
must increase as well. That is, when the transmission link is congested, the value of nancial
transmission rights varies directly with the contraction of output and the increase in delivered
energy prices in the South associated with the exercise of market power in the South.
Assume that G2 holds a fraction 22[0; 1] of the K nancial rights available. It now faces
the following prot function to maximize:
2(2) = maxp2 fG(p2) + 2F(p2)g
= maxp2 fp2 [D(p2)−K]− C2 (D(p2)−K) + 2 [p2 − C
0
1(K)]Kg
= maxp2 f2 (2; p2)g :
Note that @2 (2; p2) =@2@p2 = K > 0: The larger the fraction 2 of rights held by
the generator, the stronger its incentive to jack up the price in the South. The optimum
p2(2) is increasing continuously
7 in 2 from p2(0) = p
m
2 to p2(1) (which maximizes fp2D(p2)−
KC 01(K)−C2(D(p2)−K)g. The prot maximizing price for G2 to set for energy in the South
increases directly with 2, and as 2 increases the quantity produced by G2 decreases as well.
G2 now has two revenue streams: one stream of revenue from sales of energy (G) and a second
stream of revenues from the congestion rents (F) that it is entitled to by virtue of holding the
nancial rights. The more G2 internalizes the congestion rent, the higher the congestion rent
by virtue of G2’s control of p2. When G2 has nancial rights, it eectively reduces the elasticity
of the residual demand curve and increases its market power. Let (2)  p2(2) − C 01(K) =
p2(2)− p1.
When 2 = 1, the monopoly in the South faces the total demand (D(p2)) rather than the
residual demand (D(p2)−K) it faces when it holds no nancial rights. That is, if the monopoly
generator in the South holds all the nancial rights, it maximizes its prot ( G2’s net revenues
from supplying energy plus its revenues from congestion rents) as if it had a monopoly over the
7G() + 2F() is strictly concave since we assumed that G() is.
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entire demand function. In doing so, G2 sacrices some prots it would otherwise earn from
supplying electricity (G) in order to increase the prots it receives in the form of \dividends"
(F) on the nancial rights it owns as a result of its ability to increase the price p2 in the South.
The actual allocation and prices of nancial rights will depend on the attributes of the
market for these rights, in particular on whether the rights market operates in such as way as
to lead G2 successfully to bid for all of the rights. We examine the attributes of the market for
nancial rights and the resulting allocations when we discuss the microstructures of nancial
rights markets below.
3.3 Other types of market power in the energy market
3.3.1 Generator market power at the cheap node
Suppose that G1 is a monopoly in the North, while production in the South is competitive and
there is no buyer market power. In contrast with the case of generator market power at the
expensive node, nancial rights holding by the generator with market power at the cheap node
has no impact. To see this, suppose rst that G1 holds no nancial rights. As is well-known
from the literature (e.g., Oren 1997, Stoft 1997), nancial rights are then worthless: Financial
rights on the line of a two-node network can have positive value only if the capacity is fully
used. Suppose that q1 = K and p1 < p2. Then G1 can bid to supply a xed amount K − "
(where " is small) and raise p1 discontinuously to p2 (which is hardly aected).
In a sense, G1 eectively already \owns" the transmission rights even if formally owns no
nancial rights. So G1’s holding transmission rights has no eect on prices or quantities and
does not enhance its market power.
Remark: If there is a monopoly in the North as well as in the South, then the monopoly in
the North will capture all of the congestion rents (by bidding a xed quantity q1 = K − " for
" substantially small) and the value of nancial rights will be zero. Thus, adding a monopoly
generator in the North when there is a monopoly generator in the South mitigates the market
power enhancing eect of nancial rights on the market power of the monopoly generator in the
South and leads to lower prices p2 in the South compared to the case when there is competitive
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generation in the North. That is, even if the monopoly generator in the South holds a fraction
2 of nancial rights, the equilibrium price in the South is p2(0) = p
m
2 rather than p2(2).
3.3.2 Consumers with buyer market power
Finally consider the case where there is buyer market power (a monopsony) in the South. If
the monopsony holds nancial rights, its monopsony power actually decreases since the value
of nancial rights declines as the price p2 in the South declines. [This does not mean that
the monopsony will not acquire the rights; after all, its demand behavior impacts the value of
rights, and so its acquiring rights help internalize this externality and creates gains from trade.]
In contrast, if there were a monopsony in the North and competitive behavior in the South,
the behavior of the monopsony in the North could be aected if it held nancial rights. By
reducing the price in the North (which is feasible if marginal cost in the North is strictly in-
creasing), the monopsonist increases the dierence between the nodal prices and the congestion
rents it receives. This leads to further distortion of demand in the competitive upstream market
(compared to monopsony without rights) and a reduction in welfare. So, if there are consumers
with market power in the exporting region, allocating to them nancial rights increases their
incentives to reduce purchases, enhances their market power and reduces welfare.
3.3.3 Summing up
While several cases must be considered depending on who has market power, the general logic
is simple and intuitive: Financial rights holdings by a producer in the importing region or by
a consumer in the exporting region aggrevates their market power since nancial rights give
them an extra incentive to curtail their output or demand to make the rights more valuable. In
contrast, nancial rights holdings by a monopsony in the importing region mitigate its market
power by giving it an incentive to raise price in the importing region. Last, nancial rights
holdings by a monopolist in the exporting region have no impact on market power, since the
monopolist can already capture the congestion rents in the absence of rights.
We will from now on focus mainly on the case of monopoly power in the South. The
treatment of the other cases is a straightforward extension of this benchmark situation, and
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will be considered in various levels of detail.
4 Microstructure of markets for nancial rights
The allocation of nancial rights, and ultimately their impact on generation markets, depends
on the attributes of the market for these rights as well as on the willingness to pay of generators
and consumers. We oer a preliminary exploration of the attributes of the nancial rights
market and their implications for the allocation and pricing of these rights in this section.
We return now to the case in which G2 is a local monopolist in the South, supply at the
cheap node in the North (G1) is competitive and all demand is in the South. We assume initially
that consumers (distributors acting as agents for consumers or end-use consumers directly) in
the South are not in the market for nancial rights, or, if they are, that the ownership of these
rights is too dispersed to create countervailing power to G2 in the purchase and sale of the
rights.
From our discussion of the eects of ownership of nancial rights on G2’s behavior we know
that the value of nancial rights increases with G2’s holdings of such rights. In this respect, G2
resembles the raider or large shareholder of the corporate nance literature (Grossman-Hart
1980, Shleifer-Vishny 1986, Admati et al 1994, Burkart et al 1998).8 G2 would like to get all of
the nancial rights, but pay as little as it can for them. We know from the corporate nance
literature that the realization of gains from trade between the initial holders of the nancial
rights (shares) and the value enhancing raider (G2) depends on the extent of free riding and
therefore on the microstructure of the rights market. Here, the initial nancial rights (share)
holders would like to hold on to their rights and capture their full value resulting from a larger
dierence in nodal prices. However, the value of the rights is maximized only if G2 acquires all
of them.
There is a wide variety of possible trading structures for nancial rights. We consider three
cases which (a) are interesting in their own right and (b) represent two polar cases and one
8A slight dierence (which simplies the analysis) with the raider in a corporate control situation is that the
impact of holdings moves continuously instead of jumping at 51% of the rights.
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intermediate case of free riding. The three cases are:
a) No Free Riding : Rights are initially held by a single owner who is neither a generator nor
a consumer. The single owner bargains with potential purchasers over the price at which the
rights will be transferred.
b) Full Free Riding : In this case the initial ownership of rights is dispersed among non-
stakeholders and stakeholders without market power. G2 makes a tender oer at some price
. The tender oer is unconditional.
c) Partial Free Riding : Here we assume that all of the rights are auctioned o to the highest
bidders by the ISO, as proposed for California.9
We also want to examine the eects of allowing consumers (distributors acting as agents
for their end-use customers or end-use customers directly) to buy nancial rights. We discuss
each of these cases in turn.
4.1 Financial rights initially held by a single nonstakeholder owner
(no free riding)
4.1.1 No consumer coalition
In this case, since G2 has the highest value for the rights (in terms of prots, not total surplus)
in the absence of bidding by consumers, G2 will acquire all of the rights at a price negotiated
with the initial owner. Accordingly, G2’s market power is enhanced and the equilibrium price
p2 is higher than it would be in the absence of nancial rights. The negotiated market price for
the nancial rights will lie somewhere between m = (0) and (1). G2 and the initial owner
share the \surplus"
[G(p2(1)) + F(p2(1))]− [G(p2(0) + F(p2(0))]:
9The nance literature has looked at alternative environments in which the gains from trade between the
raider and the initial shareholders are partially realized. In Kyle-Vila (1991) the presence of liquidity traders
allows the raider to disguise her purchases (as long as she restricts her order flow) and prevents full free riding. In
Holmstro¨m-Nalebu (1992), the value of the rm increases discontinuously when the raider obtains a controlling
share. It is shown that if initial shareholders hold several shares each, then in a symmetric (mixed-strategy)
equilibrium of the tendering subgame, shareholders cannot fully free ride.
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The division of the monopoly rents associated with G2’s ownership of all of the rights depends
on the relative bargaining power of G2 and the initial owner.
Remark: It is important that the nancial rights be in positive net supply through the market.
Suppose in contrast that the congestion rents are allocated to a party who is prevented from
selling them and participating in the nancial market (i.e. the owner cannot contract directly
or indirectly with G2). The rights would then de facto be in zero net supply. Would a group
of investors want to enter into a \gambling contract" with G2 specifying that the investors will
pay (p2 − p1)t to G2 once nodal prices are realized, where t > 0 is the scale of the nancial
deal (\gambling" refers to the fact that G2’ two components of prot G(p2) and (p2 − p1)t
both increase with p2)? The answer is no: The aggregate prot of G2 and the investors,
G(p2(2))− G(p2(0)), where t = 2K is the size of the side deal, would then be negative.
4.1.2 Consumer coalition
Next consider the case where we allow consumers to form a coalition to bid against G2 for
the rights and assume that they solve their collective action problem. The coalition thus has
market power in the rights market, but (due to antitrust enforcement, say) consumers do not
collude in the energy market. Suppose that the initial owner of the rights auctions them o as
a single bundle to the highest bidder using a second-price (English) auction.10 In this case G2’s
willingness to pay is:
[G(p2(1)) + F(p2(1))]− G(p2(0));
and the consumers’ willingness to pay is:Z p2(1)
p2(0)
D(p2)dp2 + F(p2(0)):
The consumers’ willingness to pay is higher:Z p2(1)
p2(0)
D(p2)dp2 − [G(p2(1)) + F(p2(1))− G(p2(0))−F(p2(0))]
= −
Z p2(1)
p2(0)
(p2 − C
0
2)D
0(p2) > 0;
10The type of auction appears to be irrelevant.
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since G0+F 0 = D(p2)−C 02D
0+ p2D
0 ; and so consumers outbid G2. Social surplus is higher as
a result of consumers outbidding G2.
There are two obstacles to consumers’ winning the auction and obtaining the nancial
rights. First, they must solve their collective action problem. Second, a distribution company
would be subject to a prudency review which would destroy its incentives to buy the rights
even though it benets consumers. If it were successful in buying up the rights and mitigating
G2’s market power, it might appear to the regulators ex post that the distributor paid \too
much" for the nancial rights. This is the case because consumers appear to \lose money" by
buying the rights:
F(p2(0))− [G(p2(1)) + F(p2(1))− G(p2(0))] < 0:
That is, if the regulator compared the amount the distributor paid for the rights with their
ex post value, measured by the ex post dierence in nodal prices, it might conclude that the
distributor overpaid and penalize it for the overpayment. Such an evaluation incorrectly ignores
the fact that by purchasing the nancial rights the distributor mitigates G2’s market power and
conveys the benets of lower prices to consumers.11
4.2 Tender oer by G2 (full free riding)
It is clear that when G2 makes an unconditional tender oer to dispersed owners (without
market power in either market) who initially hold the rights, it does not want to purchase any
rights: Suppose G2 oers to buy whatever is tendered at a price  such that
(0) <   (1):
The fraction 2 of rights tendered is given by:
 = (2) = p2(2)− p

1:
G2’s prot is then given by
G(p2(2)) + 2F(p2(2))− 2K = G(p2(2)) < G(p2(0));
11As we mentioned earlier, if there were a generation monopolist at the cheap node in the North, the value
of the nancial rights would be zero since the generation monopolist in the North would capture all of the
congestion rents in its prot-maximizing energy price.
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where p2(0) maximizes G2’s prots from supplying generation service.
12
The point made in this section is completely general. Any player who makes a tender oer
buys the rights at a price equal to their ex post price. The value of the rights goes up or at
least stays constant after a stakeholder with market power (consumer or producer in the North
or the South) purchases a fraction of the rights from nonstakeholders or stakeholders with no
market power. However, the utility of the stakeholder with market power purchasing the rights
decreases and, as a result, it will purchase no rights in this case. This is the case because G2
must sacrice some prots associated with the supply of generation service in order to jack up
the price of energy p2. However, it cannot recoup these lost prots through the higher dividends
on any rights it buys resulting from such a price increase because the value of these dividends
would be reflected in the price it would pay for the rights. Since there is full free riding on any
enhanced value of rights that G2 can create by further contracting its output and increasing
p2, it is not protable for it to buy any rights.
4.3 Auctioning of the rights by the ISO (partial free riding)
Assume that there is no consumer coalition and the ISO auctions o all of the rights simulta-
neously. We analyze a discriminatory auction, that is an auction in which i) bidders announce
a price and a maximum quantity they are willing to buy at this price, ii) rights are allocated
to the highest bidders13, and iii) bidders pay their bids. We assume that the market is deep in
the sense that risk neutral arbitrageurs, the market makers, stand ready to arbitrage away any
prot opportunity.
Note rst that G2’s bid cannot be deterministic. Suppose G2 bids  > (0) and purchases
2K rights. Either 2 = 0 and then market makers overpay for the rights (they pay above 
for rights whose value is (0)). Or 2 > 0, and   (2) (if  < (2), then a market maker
12With conditional oers, we are back to the absence of free riding: G2 can oer to pay  = p2(0) − p1 + "
(where " is small) and stipulate that the oer is valid only if all rights are tendered.Then everyone tenders.
Note, though, that with a conditional oer it makes a dierence whether the rights are held by nanciers or by
stakeholders (we are grateful to Bruno Biais for this point). The no-free riding point holds only if the rights
are held by nanciers. Suppose for example that a competitive consumer in the South holds a single right. By
refusing to tender this right the consumer forgoes the prot " on the sale, but lowers the price in the South
from p2(1) to p2(0) by defeating the tender oer.
13The rationing rule used in case of a tie will turn out to be irrelevant.
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could make a prot by bidding for one right at a price between  and (2)); so G2’s prot is
at most G(p2(2)) < G(p2(0)). That is, G2 would be better o not bidding for rights. But if G2
does not bid for rights, market makers (or stakeholders without market power) are willing to
pay (0), in which case G2 can buy all rights at a price just above (0) and increase its prot,
a contradiction. Hence G2 must randomize in equilibrium. Furthermore, G2 optimally buys all
rights available at his bid.14
The market makers face a winner’s curse problem: They tend to get rights precisely when
G2 does not and so when rights are not very valuable. The consequence of this winner’s curse
is that the competitive market makers’ demand function is not flat at some price, but rather
downward sloping. A higher bid by a market maker is costly and so must be compensated by
a higher value of the right conditionally on the bid being a winning bid. The distribution of
the number of rights held by G2 conditionally on bid  being a winning bid indeed shifts to the
right when  grows, if the market makers’ demand function is downward sloping.
In equilibrium G2 randomizes over the interval [(0); ], where (0) <  < (1), according
to density h() and cumulative distribution function H(). [That is, the probability that G2’s
bid is less than  is H().] The market makers’ aggregate demand is given by a decreasing
function d^(), with d^((0)) = K and d^() = 0. For the purpose of the analysis, it will be
convenient to dene the fraction of rights ^2() that is acquired by G2 when bidding :
^2()K = K − d^();
with ^02 > 0, ^2((0)) = 0, ^2() = 1.
G2’s behavior in the rights market
In order for G2 to be indierent between all bids in [(0); ], it must be the case that they
all yield G2 the same prot, equal to the prot G(p2(0)) obtained by bidding (0) and obtaining
no rights:
G(p2(0)) = G(p2(^2())) + ^2()F(p2(^2()))− ^2()K: (4)
Equation (4) denes an increasing function ^2() and thereby a decreasing demand d^() by
14This is a consequence of the fact that his prot is convex in the number of rights purchased at a given price.
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the market makers. The upper bound of the support of G2’s strategy, , is given by
((1)− )K = G(p2(0))− G(p2(1)):
Market makers’ zero-prot condition
Consider a market maker playing a bid for one right at price  2 [(0); ]. With probability
1−H(), G2’s bid is higher and the market maker’s bid is not selected. With probability H(),
the market maker receives the right. His prot when G2’s bid is ~ <  is [p2(^2(~))− p1]− ,
and so the zero-prot condition for all  can be written as: For all  2 [(0); ],Z 
(0)
[[p2(^2(~))− p

1]− ]h(~)d(~) = 0:
This condition is obviously satised at  = (0). For it to be satised over the whole interval,
the derivative of the left-hand side must be equal to zero, or
h()
H()
=
1
[p2(^2())− p1]
: (5)
Knowing ^2() from (4), equation (5) denes the bidding strategy H() for G2.15
The number of rights purchased by G2 is random and intermediate between those purchased
under full free riding (none) and no free riding (all).
5 Regulatory issues associated with nancial rights
We have shown that certain players with market power, namely a generator at the expensive
node or consumers at the cheap node, may bid for nancial rights and then enhance their
value by restricting output or consumption. In both instances, the rm with market power
takes a gambling rather than a hedging position, and welfare is reduced because their own-
ership of transmission rights increases prices and increases the cost of supplying electricity.
This necessarily raises the question of whether regulatory oversight can mitigate this source of
15Integrating (5) yields H() = exp(−
Z 

‘(~)d~), where ‘() is the right-hand side of (5). Using (4) and the
rst-order condition dening p2(2), it can be seen that ‘() is of the order 1=( − (0)) in the neighborhood
of (0) and so H((0)) = 0.
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ineciency. One might consider preventing rms with local market power from buying trans-
mission rights when they involve gambling rather than hedging. That is, positions whose value
covaries positively with the value of the player’s position in the absence of these rights would be
prohibited.
While a regulatory rule built around this basic principle is likely to provide a useful con-
ceptual framework for designing regulatory surveillance programs, there are several practical
problems in applying it in practice in a way that increases welfare. First, in an environment in
which there is uncertainty about the nodal price dierential, the implications of the previous
discussion is that generators in the South and consumers in the North may take on more risk
(\underhedge") than they would if purchasing nancial rights did not enhance their market
power. While one can prohibit taking gambling positions, it becomes dicult to assess the ex-
tent of underhedging in practice, though one might be able to do so in specic circumstances.16
Second, in our model, one possible benchmark for measurement of \gambling behavior " is
that, in the absence of nancial holdings by the player with local market power, this player’s
prot is positively correlated with the value of congestion rents. So, a simple rule might be
that generators are not allowed to acquire nancial rights if their value is positively correlated
with the value of the rm’s generation prots.
To show that this benchmark and the associated simple rule are not necessarily appropriate,
let us return to our basic model with a constrained link of capacity K, a competitive supply
in the North with cost function C1(q1), a monopolist with cost function C2(q2) in the South,
with consumers demanding D(p2) in the South. Let us add an exogenous and random supply
of power at the two nodes. For example, there may be hydroelectric supplies at both locations,
and the amount of energy they can produce is contingent on random variations in rainfall from
year to year. Let  denote the random supply in the North and " denote the random supply
in the South. The two supplies are thus perfectly correlated. There is much more hydroelectric
16The regulatory strategy would then be similar to that adopted for the England-Wales system in the early
l990s when the two largest generators created from the existing CEBG were forced to sell a substantial fraction
of their output forward using contracts for dierences (CFD). For theoretical analyses of the impact of CFD’s
on market power in systems with uniform prices, see Green (1992), Allaz-Villa (1993) and Allaz (1992). Such
analyses in turn are closely related to the Coase conjecture (see. e.g., Tirole 1988).
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supply in the North if " is small, however.
The price in the North,
p1 = C
0
1(K − )
is a decreasing function of realized hydroelectric energy supplies . Similarly, the price in the
South in the absence of nancial holdings by the local monopolist in the South is,
p2 = arg max
p2
f[D(p2)− " −K] p2 − C2 (D(p2)− " −K)g
is a decreasing function of , and so is the local monopolist’s prot. But if " is small enough,
p2 hardly moves with , and so
@
@
(p2 − p1) > 0:
Thus, from a statistical viewpoint, the local monopolist can hedge by purchasing nancial
rights. But at the same time we showed above that such purchases increase its market power.
This obviously complicates the regulator’s surveillance problem.
Another surveillance index might be to examine whether it can be demonstrated that the
acquisition of nancial rights by a local monopoly generator led to an increase in the dierence
in nodal prices. In our analysis above, the voluntary purchase of nancial rights by players
with local market power both increased the value of these rights (by increasing the dierence
in nodal prices) and reduced output and economic welfare. The two eects do not always go
together, however. The following example shows that the purchase of nancial rights by players
with market power may increase welfare and congestion rents simultaneously.17
Consider a two-node system with no production in the South and no consumption in the
North. The South imports its entire demand from the North over the congested link with
capacity K. The price in the South is then dened by:
K = D(pk2):
A generator with market power in the North can produce an arbitrary amount q1 at a constant
marginal cost c1. The generator with market power faces a group of more expensive fringe
17This example builds on Stoft’s (1997, 1998) analysis of strategic expropriation of the rights’ value. By adding
an inecient fringe to his analysis, we can show that the expropriation does not just lead to a redistribution of
wealth, but also to a reduction in welfare if the inecient fringe supplies in equilibrium.
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suppliers also located in the North. These fringe suppliers have marginal cost cf1 > c1 and can
produce quantities up to qf1 < K. Thus, economic eciency requires that these fringe suppliers
not produce and the low cost supplier serve all demand.
Suppose rst that there are no nancial rights. Then the dominant rm will maximize
prots taking supplies from the competitive fringe into account. If the prot maximizing price
exceeds cf1 , then the competitive fringe supplies q
f
1 and the dominant rm’s prot is bounded
above by:
1 = (p
k
2 − c1)(K − q
f
1 );
since the nodal price in the North cannot exceed that in the South. The monopolist can actually
obtain 1 by manipulating her supply curve in the following way. The dominant rm oers
a xed supply K − qf1 − ", where " is arbitrarily small. The line is then not congested and
p1 = p2 = p
k
2.
Alternatively, the prot maximizing price could be below cf1 and the dominant rm would
produce the entire amount K. By undercutting slightly the fringe, the dominant rm gets
1 = (c
f
1 − c1)K:
Production ineciency occurs when 1 < 1 since the fringe supplies. This will be the case
when the competitive fringe’s output is relatively small or its production cost is relatively low.
Let’s assume that 1 < 1 , but let us suppose that the dominant rm holds the nancial
rights to the link. The payo attached to the rst strategy is unaected because the rights have
no value. In contrast, the payo to the second strategy (ignoring the sunk cost of purchasing
these rights) is now
1 + (p
k
2 − c
f
1)K = (p
f
2 − c1)K > 

1 :
Production eciency now holds since the dominant rm gets the rents from owning the nancial
rights and has no incentive to \expropriate" rents from third party owners of these rights. This
example thus shows that in fashioning a regulatory rule to mitigate the market power enhancing
eects of nancial rights, we cannot rely on the assumption that increases in the value of
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nancial rights resulting from the behavior of a generator with market power necessarily leads
to a reduction in output and welfare. The two eects do not necessarily go together.
6 Loop flows
While some networks or subnetworks are well approximated by the radial structure that we
have studied until now, more complex networks exhibit loop flows associated with the fact that
electrons follow the path of least resistance. For example, in a three-node network (e.g., Figure
1), a power injection at one node (e.g., node 1 in Figure 1) and an equal amount withdrawal
at another node (e.g., node 3 in Figure 1) aect not only the congestion on the line linking
the two nodes, but also the congestion on the other two lines (node 1 to node 2 and node 2
to node 3) as well. On electrical networks with multiple interconnected links, the patterns of
electricity flows follow physical laws known as Kirchho’s laws (Schweppe et al. 1988). When
power is injected at one node and withdrawn (consumed) at another, the power supplied to
the network is distributed across multiple interconnected links and not simply over the link
that provides a direct connection between the injection node and the consumption node. The
distribution of the power flows over these multiple interconnected links is simply referred to as
\loop flow." We provide below a simple intuitive discussion of the physics of loop flows and
specify the characteristics of these flows on a simple three-node network with links of equal
impedance. This section shows that our insights carry over in the presence of loop flows and
gains a few new insights. Following an extensive literature on the topic,18 we illustrate the ideas
by means of a simple three-node network with two nodes of (net) production and one node of
(net) consumption. We ignore losses and assume that the three links have equal impedance.
We begin with the case in which the transmission line between the two generation nodes is
congested, which as we will see is the direct analog of the two-node network and then describe
how the analysis changes for dierent patterns of congestion.
18See, e.g., Nasser (1997), Oren et al (1995), and Oren (1996).
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Node 3: Consumption
q3 = D(p3)
Figure 1
6.1 Absence of nancial rights
Consider the network described in Figure 1. As in the two-node network, nodes 1 and 2 are the
low- and high-marginal- cost production nodes respectively (C 01 < C
0
2 over the relevant range).
Furthermore, production is competitive at node 1 and produced by a monopoly G2 at node
2. Consumption occurs now at node 3. There, consumers demand q3 = D(q3), with inverse
demand function p3 = P (q3). The line between nodes 1 and 2 has capacity K and is congested,
while the other two lines have excess capacity.
We assume that there are no losses on the lines, and so
q1 + q2 = q3: (6)
The laws of electricity (Kirchho’s) determine the flows through the three transmission
lines. A reader unfamiliar with electric networks can think about electricity balance in the
following terms: Electricity flowing from node i2f1; 2g to node 3 must follow the path of least
resistance. This implies that the resistances encountered along the two possible paths (direct,
and indirect through the other production node) are equal.19 Because the indirect path is twice
as long as the direct path, so is the resistance. This implies that a unit production at one node
generates a one-third flow through along the indirect path and twice as much along the direct
19This is Ohm’s law: the dierence in potential between two nodes is equal to the product of resistance and
intensity.
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path.20 Because we focus here on the congestion of the line between the two generating nodes,
the constraint becomes q13 − q23
  K;
or using the fact that there is a lower marginal cost and so more production in the North than
in the South
q1 − q2  3K: (7)
Under bid-based dispatch, the Independent System Operator dispatches productions, q1
and q2, and consumption q3 so as to maximize social surplus (consumer surplus minus total
production cost, as revealed by the players) subject to the feasibility constraints f(6), (7)g.21
Letting  denote the shadow price of constraint (7), the nodal prices satisfy at the optimum:
p1 = p3 −

3
; (8)
and
p2 = p3 +

3
: (9)
And so
p3 =
p1 + p2
2
: (10)
To understand (8) and (9), note that in the absence of a transmission constraint everything
would be produced at node 1, since production there is both competitively supplied and cheaper
than production at node 2. A congested line limits the production at node 1. An extra unit
produced at node 1 generates an added load of one-third on the congested line and so must be
subject to a \tax" equal to =3 (i.e., one third of the shadow price of the constraint). Conversely,
a unit production at node 2 unloads the constraint by one third and should therefore receive
a \subsidy" equal to =3. The \tax" paid by generators at node 1 is the price consumers pay
at node 3 less 1/3 of the shadow price of congestion (=3). That is, the equilibrium price
generators at node 1 see is less than the equilibrium price consumers pay at node 3. The
20These flows may be ctitious. Indeed, if generators at nodes 1 and 2 produce the same output and therefore
generate the same, but opposite ctitious flows through the line located between them, no power actually flows
through that line since the two ctitious flows cancel.
21See Schweppe et al. (1988) for the generalization of the following analysis to an arbitrary electrical network.
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\subsidy" provided to generators at node 2 is the price consumers pay at node 3 plus 1/3 of the
shadow price of congestion. That is, the equilibrium price generators see at node 2 is greater
than the equilibrium price consumers pay at node 3.
Using (6), (7) and (10), we thus obtain:
p2 = 2P (2q2 + 3K)− p1:
Competitive behavior at node 1 further implies that
p1 = C
0
1(q1) = C
0
1(q2 + 3K):
We therefore obtain the prot from generation for the monopoly at node 2 (which we here
write for convenience as a function of q2 rather than p2):
G(q2)  p2q2 − C2(q2);
or
G(q2)  [2P (2q2 + 3K)− C
0
1(q2 + 3K)] q2 − C2(q2): (11)
In the absence of nancial rights, G2 selects q2  0 so as to maximize G(q2). It is interesting
to note that G2 receives two benets from withholding output in comparison with the case
where it is price taker. Recall that p2 = p3 + (=3). By reducing q2, G2 increases the consumer
price p3 = P (2q2 + 3K); actually the standard contractionary eect (the elasticity of demand)
is doubled since, unlike the two-node case, a reduction in the production in the South forces
an equal reduction of the output in the North. In other words production in the South and
the North are local complements, where \local" refers to the fact that for large transmission
capacities the two outputs become substitutes. Second, a reduction in output q2 increases
congestion and thereby the subsidy =3 = p3 − p1 received for production in the South. [This
subsidy increases because p3 increases and also, if production in the North exhibits decreasing
returns to scale, because the cost of the marginal plant in the North decreases, making q2-
enabled production in the North more desirable.]
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6.2 Impact of nancial rights
With more than two nodes, there are at least two ways of introducing nancial rights:
 Link-based rights: Link-based rights are nancial rights associated with a transmission line
and paying a dividend equal to the shadow price of the congestion on that line . Such rights are
for example being put in place in California.
In our context, the only linked-based rights with positive value are those attached to the link
between nodes 1 and 2. Suppose that K such rights are issued; then the total dividend is K.
This total dividend corresponds exactly to (and therefore can be covered by) the merchandizing
surplus, that is
p3q3 − p1q1 − p2q2 = (p3 − p1)q1 + (p2 − p1)q2 =

3
(q1 − q2) = K
(since q1 − q2 = 3K).
 Fictitious-bilateral-trades-based rights: Financial rights were rst designed by Hogan (1992)
in a dierent way. He considered the set of bilateral trades that are feasible (meaning here
that they satisfy (6) and (7)). Such trades may, but need not be those that actually occur.
For example, suppose that producers at node i (i = 1; 2) ctitiously sell qi units in bilateral
contracts with consumers at node 3. Those trades are feasible if q1− q2  3K. These ctitious
trades create by denition q1 nancial rights between nodes 1 and 3, yielding dividend p3 − p1
each, and q2 nancial rights between nodes 2 and 3, yielding dividend p3 − p2 each, where
prices refer to the ex post equilibrium prices for the market outcomes (and thus not necessarily
to the prices corresponding to the ctitious trades). The total dividend to be paid for prices
(p1; p2; p3) is therefore
(p3 − p1)q1 + (p3 − p2)q2 =

3
(q1 − q2)  K:
Thus the dividend can again be covered by the merchandizing surplus.22
Without loss of generality, we here consider link-based rights. Suppose that K such rights
22This result extends to arbitrary networks: see Hogan (1992) and the appendix of Chao-Peck (1996). The
two types of rights are equivalent as long as a) the amount of link-based rights is equal to the capacity of the
line, and b) the ctitious trades in the Hogan approach exhaust the transmission constraint.
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are held by a nonstakeholding investor who then (as in section 4.1) resells them to the monopoly
producer in the South. The value of these rights is
F(q2) = K = 3[P (2q2 + 3K)− C
0
1(q2 + 3K)]K:
The value of nancial rights decreases with q2 for the now familiar two reasons: decrease in
consumer price and increase in the marginal cost in the North due to local complementarity.
G2 thus solves
max
q2
fG(q2) + F(q2)g ;
and, as in the radial network case, restricts output further than in the absence of nancial rights.
Indeed, the result acording to which G2 optimizes against the full demand curve generalizes,
since
G(q2) + F(q2) = p3q3 − p1q1 − C2(q2)
= P (2q2 + 3K)(2q2 + 3K)− q1C 01(q1)− C2(q2):
With the required adjustments, the insights of section 4.1 thus carry over from the two-node
network to the three-node network; so do the insights of sections 4.2 and 4.3.
6.3 Other patterns of congestion
Let us now assume that one of the direct links between a production node and the consumption
node is congested while the other links are not: see gure 2. We keep the notation \K" for the
capacity of the congestion link even though the identity of that link has changed.
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Figure 2
In case (a), the capacity constraint on the line between nodes 1 and 3 can be written as
2
3
q1 +
1
3
q2  K;
where K now denotes the capacity of that line. Note that the two outputs are now local
substitutes. A contraction in output (q2) at the expensive node leads to an increase in output
(q1) and an associated increase in the marginal cost at node 1. The reader can check that
23
F(q2) =
2664P

3K + q2
2

+ C 01

3K − q2
2

2
3775 q2 − C2(q2);
and
G(q2) =
3
2

P

3K + q2
2

− C 01

3K − q2
2

K:
Again, G2 optimizes against the full demand curve (that is, maximizes p3q3 − q1C 01(q1) −
C2(q2)), when owning the nancial rights. The impact of G2’s ownership of nancial rights is
a priori more ambiguous than in section 6.2. An output contraction by G2 raises the consumer
price, but also by a substitution eect, increases the marginal cost in the North. The net eect
on the shadow price of the congested line is a priori unclear, unless returns to scale in the North
23Letting  denote the shadow price of the congested line, the nodal prices are
p1 = p3 −
2
3
and p2 = p3 −

3
.
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decrease slowly, in which case G2’s ownership of nancial rights enhances market power. If the
marginal cost of the generators in the North were constant, allocating nancial rights to G2
would lead it to contract output further than it would in the absence of nancial rights.
Case (b) is more interesting. There, G2 is on the wrong side of the capacity constraint, and
does not produce in the absence of nancial rights: Its marginal cost is higher than that of
producers in the North, and furthermore G2 makes twice as much use of the congested line as
they do and therefore gets taxed twice as much.24
Suppose now that G2 owns the nancial rights. Despite its double disadvantage, G2 may
produce so as to enhance the value of nancial rights. Straightforward computations show that
F(q2) + G(q2) = p3q3 − q1C 01(q1)− C2(q2);
= P (3K − q2)(3K − q2)− (3K − 2q2)C 01(3K − 2q2)− C2(q2):
and so
d (F(q2) + G(q2))
dq2
q2 = 0
 −3P 0(3K)K + 6KC 001 (3K) + [2C
0
1(3K)− P (3K)− C
0
2(0)] :
The term in brackets in the right-hand side of the derivative is approximately equal to 0 if
i) the line is hardly congested when G2 does not produce,
25 and ii) C 02(0) is close to C
0
1(3K).
Under i) and ii), G2’s two handicaps relative to G1 are small, and so G2 gains by increasing its
load and making the line appear more congested.
This articial loading of the line by its owner is reminiscent of the example given in section
5.2, in which the monopoly owner in the North (thus on the wrong side of the constraint in the
two-node network) has an incentive to increase its supply when owning the nancial rights on
the congested line. The welfare implications of this strategic load are however quite dierent.
Increased supply in section 5.2 eliminated the inecient fringe in the North and improved
24The capacity constraint is now
q1
3
+
2q2
3
 K;
and the nodal prices are
p1 = p3 −

3
and p2 = p3 −
2
3
:
25That is, p3 = P (3K) is close to p1 = C
0
1(3K).
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welfare. Here, increased supply has two perverse eects : By locating some production near
the constraint, it reduces total supply to the consumers; and it substitutes expensive power for
cheap power, resulting in production ineciency.
7 Conclusion
When there is seller and/or buyer market power in an unregulated electricity market, the
allocation of nancial transmission rights can enhance market power and induce production
ineciency. Whether and how nancial rights can have such eects depends on numerous
factors including the conguration of the underlying market power problems (location, buyer vs
seller) and the microstructure of the market for transmission rights. The allocation of nancial
rights appears most likely to have adverse welfare eects (ignoring the value of hedging to
reduce risk) when rights are allocated to a supplier with market power at the expensive node
(the importing region) or to a buyer with market power at the cheap node (the exporting
region). The extension to a three-node network which allows us to consider the eects of
loop flows enriches the analysis by revealing more complex interactions between generators.
However, it does not aect our basic conclusions about the impact of nancial transmission
rights on market power. Unfortunately, simple hard and fast rules for regulatory surveillance
of the allocation of transmission rights are not readily apparent. Nevertheless, our sense is that
regulators can usefully focus their attention on large concentrated accumulations of rights by
generators in the importing region and by buyers in the exporting region.
In a companion paper (Joskow-Tirole 1998) we perform a symmetrical analysis of how the
allocation of physical transmission rights and the structure of the associated rights market aect
seller and buyer market power in the electric energy market. In that paper we also compare
the performance of physical and nancial rights from a market power perspective. The basic
results for physical transmission rights are similar to those for nancial rights. Physical rights
introduce the possibility that electricity sellers with market power in the importing region
or electricity buyers with market power in the exporting region will withhold physical rights
from the market to reduce the eective transmission capacity of a congested line in order to
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enhance their market power. Such behavior creates production ineciency. The companion
paper explores transmission capacity release rules as a regulatory mechanism to mitigate such
withholding behavior.
Taken together, the results in these papers show that when rm transmission rights are in
positive net supply their allocation can interact with pre-existing electricity seller or electricity
buyer market power in ways that can enhance that market power, induce production inecien-
cies, and reduce welfare. Accordingly, as restructured electricity sectors consider the creation
and allocation of nancial and physical transmission rights, it is important that care be taken
to ensure that they do not have these deleterious eects.
35
References
Admati, A, Pfleiderer, P., and J. Zechner (1994) \Large Shareholder Activism, Risk
Sharing and Financial Market Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, 102:
1087-1130.
Allaz, B. (1992) \Oligopoly, Uncertainty and Strategic Forward Transactions," In-
ternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 10(2):297{308.
Allaz, B. and J.L. Vila (1993) \Cournot Competition, Forward Markets and E-
ciency," Journal of Economic Theory, 59(1):1{16.
Borenstein, S., J. Bushnell and S. Stoft (1997) \The Competitive Eects of Trans-
mission Capacity in a Deregulated Electricity Industry," University of California
Energy Institute.
Burkart, M. , Gromb, D. and F. Panunzi (1998) "Why Higher Takeover Premia
Protect Minority Shareholders," Journal of Political Economy,106(1):172{204.
Bushnell, J. (1998) "Transmission Rights and Market Power," mimeo, University of
California Energy Institute.
Chao, H.P., and S. Peck (1996) \A Market Mechanism for Electric Power Trans-
mission," Journal of Regulatory Economics, 10(1): 25{60.
Green, R. (1992) \Contracts and the Pool," mimeo, University of Cambridge, De-
partment of Applied Economics.
|{ (1996) \The Electricity Contract Market," mimeo, University of Cambridge,
Department of Applied Economics.
Green, R. and D. Newbery (1992) \Competition in the British Electricity Spot
Market", Journal of Political Economy, 100:929{953.
Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1980) \Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Problem, and the
Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics , 11: 42-64.
Harvey, S., W.Hogan and S. Pope (1996) \Transmission Capacity Reservations Im-
plemented Through a Spot market with Transmission Congestion Contracts,"
Electricity Journal , 9(9): 42{55.
36
Hogan, W. (1992) \Contract Networks for Electric Power Transmission," Journal
of Regulatory Economics , 4(3): 211{42.
Holmstro¨m B. and B. Nalebu (1992) \To the Raider Goes the Surplus? A Re-
examination of the Free-Rider Problem," Journal of Economics and Manage-
ment Strategy, 1:37{62.
Holmstro¨m, B. and J.Tirole (1998), \Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 106: 1-40.
Joskow, P. and R. Schmalensee (1983), Markets for Power, MIT Press.
Joskow, P. and J. Tirole (1998) \Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric
Power Networks. II: Physical Rights," mimeo, MIT and IDEI.
Kyle, A., and J.L. Vila (1991) \Noise Trading and Takeovers," Rand Journal of
Economics, 22: 54-71.
Nasser, T.O. (1997) Imperfect Markets for Power: Competition and Residual Regu-
lation in the Electricity Industry , unpublished PhD dissertation, MIT Depart-
ment of Economics.
Oren, S. (1996) \Preemption of TCCs and Deadweight Loss in Centrally Dispatched
Electricity Systems with Competitive Generation," Power WP041, UC Berkeley.
Oren, S.(1997) \Economic Ineciency and Passive Transmission Rights in Con-
gested Electricity Systems with Competitive Generation," Energy Journal,
18(1): 63{83.
Oren, S., Spiller P., Varaiya, P. and F. Wu (1995) \Nodal Prices and Transmission
Rights: A Critical Appraisal," Electricity Journal, 8: 24{35.
Schweppe, F., Caramanis, M., Tabors, R. and R. Bohn (1988) Spot Pricing of
Electricity, Kluwer Academic Publisher.
Shleifer A. and R. Vishny (1986) \Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders’
Interest," Rand Journal of Economics, 17: 293-309.
Stoft, S. (1997) \How Financial Transmission Rights Curb Market Power," The
Energy Journal, forthcoming.
37
Tabors, R. (1996) \A Market-Based Approach to Transmission Pricing," Electricity
Journal, 9(9): 61{67.
Tirole, J. (1988) The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge: MIT Press.
38
